Colombia prides itself of being the "oldest democracy in Latin America," despite the fact that for the last forty years several revolutionary movements sprung as a response to the lack of state presence and the inaccessibility of the political system. Liberals and Conservatives were the traditional dominating parties of the 20^th century, and a continuous violence emerged in the fight for power between sympathizers of the two. This rivalry became known as La Violencia, a phenomenon that left over 100.000 deaths in a period of eleven years, from 1946 to 1957 (Bushnell 1993, 205), though some authors argue that the number has been diluted in time after being estimated repeatedly over the years, and prefer to refer to the "many deaths" of La Violencia (Deas 1999, 24).

This period nurtured the early stages of today’s guerrilla forces, as many of them were brought up in the unrelenting fight between the parties. La Violencia was finally brought to an end with an agreement among Liberals and Conservatives to share power over a period of sixteen years. The "National Front," as it became known, placed two Liberal and two Conservative administrations in office alternating periods every four years (Sánchez 2001b, 21). The agreement fueled a different type of violence among those who fought for local power, and the insurgent movement began to fight for access to the political arena, continuing its struggle until the end of the accord in 1974.

In the subsequent decade the violence increased as the rebel factions gained momentum and increased their social support (Chernick 1993, 61). At this stage, the Betancur administration determined the necessity to initiate a peace process. Thus far, the struggle has extended for nearly twenty years; in the last fifteen the death toll has surpassed 20.000, including combatants and civilian population. (Sánchez 2001a, 13). Over that period, Colombia has witnessed changes in the balance of power between the government and the rebel forces, and five administrations have attempted to deal with the insurgents to achieve a non-violent solution to the conflict.

Although this study will concentrate on the two major guerrilla forces that are still undergoing combats and negotiations with the current government, it is pertinent to mention the existence of several smaller insurgent movements of different origins. Among them, the Movimiento Armado Quintín Lame (MAQL) which fought for the rights of the country’s natives. The Worker’s Revolutionary Party (PRT), was also a relatively small sized guerrilla that demobilized along with the MAQL during the Gaviria administration. The Popular Liberation Army (EPL) took part on the demobilization of the early nineties as well, in what became a promising peace agreement, which had the new Constitution as its cornerstone.

The longer-lived revolutionary guerrillas differed in their objectives and origins as well. The National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) were created in the mid 20^th century as a peasant reaction to repression, and also to the state’s lack of presence in rural areas of the country. On the contrary, the Movimiento 19 de Abril of the 1970s’ was a middle-class and student based guerrilla struggling for participation in the political arena, a space controlled for nearly a century by the traditional conservative and liberal parties.

The state itself has played a major role in the conflict, from administrations that ignored the existence of the insurgent movements, to presidents who combated them and labeled the guerrillas as bandits, to the more recent approach of finding a negotiated settlement to the nearly five decade struggle. The participation of the armed forces has also been crucial in the process. Ever since the Rojas Pinilla dictatorship in the 1950s’, followed by the National Front, and even prior to those events, the military has enjoyed enormous power. The preeminence of civilian authority over the military has been a slow process consolidated in the last two decades, especially since the establishment of the new Constitution of 1991 and the designation of a civilian as Defense Minister.

A fourth actor, which has so far been left out of any negotiations, is the self-defense movement known as the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC). This right wing "counter-insurgency" force has allegedly been linked to the military, although both the government and the armed forces have declared the illegality of such connections under the increasing pressure of human rights advocates and the international community.

The complex relationship between these four major actors: the government, the paramilitaries, the armed forces, and the left wing guerrillas, along with the introduction of new participants such as local and international non-governmental organizations, the "civilian population" and its increasing demands for government intervention, and the international community, create the current stage of the conflict. To better understand how those relationships work, this study will provide a brief overview of the history of the major armed actors.

FARC – EP Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejercito del Pueblo

The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia – the People’s Army, had its origins in the early 1950s, soon after the Conservative party regained control of the government. The movement began as a peasant self defense group against what they perceived to be a repressive state, and shortly after became involved with the Colombian Communist party (Rangel 2001, 382). However, it was not until the mid 1960s that the FARC became an insurgent movement, and was officially founded as a guerrilla group on April 1966. From that time being, its commander, Pedro Antonio Marín, also known as Manuel Marulanda Velez – Tirofijo- has led Colombia’s oldest leftist guerrilla movement (Bushnell 1993, 244; Gott 1972, 262).

Two years before their official establishment, the state had already attempted to destroy the rebel group. In a massive effort, 16.000 soldiers –a third of the country’s military forces at the time- had been mobilized to the "Independent Republic" of Marquetalia, Tirofijo’s stronghold, and with the assistance of U.S. strategists nearly annihilated all of FARC’s militants. Only 43 rebels escaped the attack, which marked a turning point in the fight against the state, when opposition forces declared an "armed rebellion" (Gott 1972, 249; Molano 2000a, 26; Sánchez, 2000b 204).

The group grew steadily over the next two decades, and by 1986 it had 3600 men distributed in 32 fronts. In 1995 the number of fronts and men had nearly doubled, and five years later it was estimated that FARC forces totaled 15.000 combatants (Safford 2002, 362). Today the ideology of the group is basically Marxist. As military analyst Alfredo Rangel describes it, they see themselves as "saviors of the poor" and believe that power only "comes from the shotgun". They regard "landlords, the bourgeoisie, as well as ‘North American imperialism’ as enemies of the people, and the fight against them is what their violent revolution pretends to solve" (Rangel 2000, 153) (Author’s translation).

Their demands have been presented through their newly created, clandestine political movement known as the Movimiento Bolivariano por la Nueva Colombia; made public on its inaugural discourse in March 2000, which include: (Movimiento Bolivariano 2000)

What started as a peasant movement eventually became a powerful guerrilla, which finances its operations through narcotraffic, extortion, and kidnapping among other practices, amassing the enormous sums of money required to maintain its presence in vast areas of the country. For over forty years the FARC has succeeded in controlling and establishing its presence in a number of regions, reaching an unprecedented concession from president Andres Pastrana in 1999, where a 42.000 square kilometer area, roughly the size of Switzerland, was demilitarized to initiate a new round of peace negotiations which concluded in February 2002. After a month of tense discussions, the FARC perpetrated 170 armed attacks and the government decided to reclaim control of the area known as the Despeje, and the rebels retreated to the mountains into hiding.

ELN Ejercito de Liberación Nacional

From the same roots of the FARC-EP, the National Liberation Army sprung as a social movement opposing government repression. The group originated in the early 1960s, fueled by the ideas of university students who came from the Liberal Revolutionary Movement –MRL, a political dissident faction of the Liberal party. By 1964 they had declared themselves Marxist-Leninists, extended their influence to rural areas, and with their Cuban influence began what later became the second largest guerrilla movement in Colombia (Safford 2002, 358).

The next decade proved harsh for this modest "handful of bearded idealists, ill equipped and even worst dressed" men (Author’s translation) (Broderick 2000, 18), who struggled to preserve their unity after having been nearly obliterated by government forces. They managed to maintain control of some rural areas with natural resource production (oil, coal, nickel), from which they obtained their funding. Kidnappings and ransoms were also a pervasive practice for the ELN, (Pécaut 1999; 144) first as a survival strategy, later on as a revenue source.

The fall of the Soviet Union had an effect on the finances of guerrilla groups, and the ELN began imposing duties on construction and oil firms that operated in the eastern plains of Colombia. By 1985 they were present in some other regions as well, but the combined forces of all guerrilla groups had only been felt in less than 200 of the almost 1000 of Colombia’s municipalities (Chernick 1999, 167). Fifteen years later, the ELN had grown to become a force of approximately 5.000 men (Schneider 2000, 757).

Along with the FARC, this group remained reluctant to participate in the peace process of the early 90s, when a new Constitution was being drafted and the government had offered participation to amnestied rebel forces. After reclaiming their status through some military actions, such as the destruction of several thousand power towers in the past few years, the group has attempted to come to terms with the Pastrana government in several occasions. It is currently in the process of initiating new negotiations, and has demanded a demilitarized zone with similar conditions to those granted to the FARC in their area of influence.

M-19 Movimiento 19 de Abril

The origins of the 19^th of April Movement are significantly different than those of the FARC or the ELN: As the National Front neared its end, the last elections were held in 1970 between Conservative Misael Pastrana, and former general Gustavo Rojas Pinilla, leader of the Alianza Nacional Popular – (ANAPO), a non traditional opposition party, defeated in what they alleged were fraudulent elections (Chernick 1999, 165). The group initiated as an urban nationalist movement against the traditional parties’ hegemonic control of the government. Its strategy was heavily influenced by the experiences of the Montoneros from Argentina, and the Tupamaros of Uruguay (Safford 2002, 357).

Constituted by "middle class professionals and intellectuals", it gained support in rural areas but was primarily an urban guerrilla (Eisenstadt 1995, 271). It became widely known for its controversial and sometimes spectacular actions, such as the theft of Simon Bolivar’s sword, the extraction of nearly 7000 weapons from a military base in Bogotá in 1979, the seizure of the Dominican Republic Embassy the following year, and the dramatic Toma del Palacio de Justicia, where M-19 commandos raided the building of the Supreme Court in 1985. The army responded to that last action by retaking the Palacio by force, which resulted in the death of all the guerrillas in the building, and half of the Supreme Court judges. The popularity and acceptance of the group were badly hurt, and the loss of some valuable militants had its toll in the organization (Bushnell 1993, 254).

After previous failed attempts, in March of 1990, the group finally signed a peace agreement where its nearly 800 members returned to civilian life. That same year the organization participated in the presidential elections with the creation of a political party, the "Democratic Alliance " ADM-19 (Zuluaga Nieto 1999, 33). Following the assassination of their leader, Carlos Pizarro, and despite the previously tainted reputation of the group after the Palace of Justice incident, they received substantial public support for their second candidate. The ADM-19 played a significant role in the creation of the 1991 Constitution, but their political support began to decrease in subsequent administrations.

Since the assassination of presidential candidate Jorge Eliecer Gaitán in 1949, the year in which La Violencia started, Colombia has had thirteen presidents, a dictator, and a military junta. General Gustavo Rojas Pinilla assumed control of the government by force in 1953, and was later replaced by a military junta, which served as a transition government prior to the National Front. Between 1958 and 1974, liberals and conservatives alternated presidencies in a mutual agreement while combating the rebel forces of peasants, which were regarded as bandits and were not given any legitimacy as social actors. In 1986, conservative Belisario Betancur stepped into office and initiated dialogues with the guerrillas, which have intermittently continued throughout the last five administrations, and will be discussed in further detail in the following pages.

The armed forces became the supportive arm of the state throughout the National Front, and by the year 1974 began following the "National Security Doctrine" developed by the United States, in which the military focused primarily on the "internal enemy" rather than on outside threats (Dávila 1999, 288). The state’s forces maintained a pattern of repression of the guerrilla movements, and the political parties in office continued with that policy until 1982.

When conservative president Belisario Betancur initiated his administration, the military consisted of 80.000 men. High officials heavily criticized his peace initiative, but he managed to maintain a weak cohesion and continued with the negotiations. However, the events of the Palace of Justice, which are described in more detail under his presidency, marked the end of his grip on the military. By the time of Barco’s mandate, the armed forces had grown by 55%, and the president enjoyed their acquiescence. The military respected the FARC stronghold of Casa Verde as a potential area to initiate dialogues and allowed for the demobilization of the M-19 in a demilitarized area reserved for that purpose (Dávila 1999, 296).

In 1990, on the day the Constitutional Assembly was being established as a symbol of the country’s resolution to move ahead, the army invaded Casa Verde, in a controversial move that many interpreted as the military’s disapproval of guerrilla participation in any political space. Nevertheless, president Gaviria enjoyed the support of the armed forces. On the contrary, when Ernesto Samper initiated his administration and was accused of having links with drug lords who apparently supported his campaign. The military’s role proved crucial in halting the negotiations with the rebels: by withdrawing their support (although the institution has always respected each administration), the armed forces left no other option to the guerrillas than to ignore Samper’s political relevance as a valid actor, because it became evident that any agreements would have been voided the moment he stepped out of office.

The current government enjoys the support of the military in spite of the fact that the guerrillas have received so many concessions. This could be explained by the modernization that the armed forces have undergone under the Pastrana administration, the increase on military spending and the funds provided by Plan Colombia destined to purchase new modern military equipment. Through the last twenty years of peace negotiations it has become evident how the armed forces may influence in presidential decisions. From Betancur, to Barco, Gaviria, Samper, and Pastrana, the major policies have been determined in the presence of and with a strong input of the armed forces.

AUC Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia

The United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia is a right wing counterinsurgency movement that had its origins over twenty years ago, as small groups of peasants and cattle ranchers sought to protect themselves from the extortions and abuses of the guerrillas. It gradually gained acceptance in rural areas, and was supported by middle class entrepreneurs to protect the properties and interests that the ill equipped Colombian army was not able to safeguard.

Many NGO’s and human rights advocates have accused the military of acquiescence with the AUCs’ actions (Human Rights Watch 1998, 48), a link that has proven to be of extreme relevance for the international community, especially for those countries offering economic aid packages such as the United States, and political support as it is the case of some members of the European Union, who do not wish to see their funds, training, and support be deviated to the counterinsurgency forces operating outside the law.

The AUC has grown exponentially over the last few years. A report of the Defense Ministry reveals that their forces are growing at a rate of 100%, while the growth of the guerrillas is only 40%. They increased their numbers from 4.500 men in 1998 to 8.150 in the year 2000 (El Tiempo, 2001b); and in a recent book of interviews with Carlos Castaño, their former military leader and now head of the AUCs’ political and ideological wing, claims the numbers have risen to 13.000 men. (Aranguren Molina, 2001, 55).

These forces have shifted the balance of power introducing a third armed actor that requires especial attention from the government, which has neglected to recognize their social impact. The AUC has not been included in any of the peace negotiations over the past two decades, and were also left out from the last peace initiative of the Pastrana government under heavy pressure by the FARC leadership.

Traditionally, Colombia’s peace process has been analyzed according to the strategies used by each government to deal with the actions and demands of the guerrillas. Five administrations – two conservatives, three liberals – have stepped into office since 1982, and in spite of the wide range of bargaining positions observed, it has been possible to establish a number of shared patterns contributing to the negotiations.

The governments of Belisario Betancur (1982 – 1986), Virgilio Barco (1986 – 1999), César Gaviria (1990 – 1994), Ernesto Samper (1994 – 1998), and Andres Pastrana (1998 – 2002), have experienced major advances and set backs on their attempts to confront guerrilla forces. The following section will analyze the approach that each administration has given to the process, and the strategies followed by all the actors involved in it.

His administration was the first to recognize the social causes of the guerrilla movement, and consequently had the initiative to launch a direct negotiation with the rebels. Throughout his political campaign, Betancur made the establishment of a peace agreement his main concern, and once in office, proposed and implemented a "National Rehabilitation Plan" (PNR). The plan was designed to increase the state’s social investment, as well as its presence in rural regions, and was meant to diminish guerrilla support in their area of influence (Eisenstadt 1995, 272).

The government made an attractive offer to the guerrillas; not only did Betancur implement the PNR, but he also offered unconditional amnesty and subsidized reinsertion to civilian life, in addition to the feasibility of a democratic opening (Chernick 1999, 176). His strategy included the nomination of negotiating commissions with representatives from various sectors of society, which some argued made the process more difficult, as the official government position became diluted amid so many voices (García Durán 1992, 48).

Although the president was determined to maintain his proposal, three factors worked against a full implementation of the peace strategy. First, the budget was very limited to fully realize all the goals of the PNR; the economy was near a recession, unemployment rates were at its highest point, and several financial groups had filed for bankruptcy (Granada 1999, 576). Second, the military did not share the same views of the president and was hesitant in relation to his policies. Measures such as the amnesty offered to imprisoned guerrilla militants, combined with the recent end to the state of siege (which was finalized in the latter months of the previous administration) produced discomfort among military ranks. It took an increase in military spending (albeit the already limited budget) to regain the endorsement of the armed forces (Dávila 1999, 291). Third, some sectors of civilian population were not very pleased with a government that left them unprotected from an ever-rising insurgent force. An author even points out that it was precisely this administration’s approach what contributed to the increase of self-defense groups (García Durán 1992, 49).

Regardless of the adverse conditions, the Betancur administration implemented its peace strategy, and the first group to respond was the FARC-EP. They agreed to lay down their weapons in 1984, and a year later created their own political party, the Unión Patriótica (Patriotic Union - UP). Authors Todd Eisenstadt and Daniel Garcia point out how "asymmetry between the authority of the rebels and that of the government was broken, as the FARC leaders acquired instant political status as well as a military profile." (Eisenstadt 1995, 273-75) This greatly benefited FARC interests and allowed them to have a relatively greater advantage in the negotiation. At that point the government agreed to demilitarize an area to the south of Bogotá, where the dialogues were held for some time. However, the truce only lasted for two years, and in spite of the fact that by 1986 the UP had gained some seats in Congress, the relations between FARC and the government deteriorated. The guerrilla continued its fight and the UP became an "orphan in the political arena". The party’s candidates and militants fell target of assassinations, which translated into nearly 2000 UP victims over a period of ten years (Chernick 1999; 176-77).

Meanwhile, the M-19 had increased its actions seeking government attention, which was eventually granted by the Betancur administration. Shortly after the group’s founder, Jaime Bateman lost his life, several captured guerrilla leaders regained their liberty, and the second peace process of the period began. A fact that perhaps affected the outcome of the negotiation was the M-19’s attempt to include the civil society, as well as interest groups on a "national dialogue," which made the government’s task of maintaining a consensus among relevant forces increasingly difficult (Eisenstadt 1995, 274). Despite the adverse conditions, the group did gain some strength as it received the legitimacy implied by political recognition.

Not only did the group gain some prestige, it also increased its military capabilities using the declared truce to its advantage. At the same time, the government failed to maintain the political parties’ and the military’s commitment to the process, which was eventually affected by the "incoherencies of the insurgency" at the negotiating table (Zuluaga Nieto 1999, 20). In spite of the evident lack of support, Betancur’s "presidential voluntarism" sustained a process short of well defined goals, until the M-19 took by force the Supreme Court building in November 1985 (Rangel 2001, 362). The immediate military reaction made clear where the armed forces stood in the process as they regained control of the building, and the infamous action of the guerrillas cut short the weak government’s peace initiative.

The EPL was involved in the negotiations as well, but after its top negotiator was killed, they joined the M-19 and the ELN in the first coalition of guerrilla forces, known as the Coordinadora Nacional Guerrillera, the National Guerrilla Coordination Front (CNG), which also included smaller groups such as the Movimiento Armado Quintin Lame (MAQL) (Eisenstadt 1995, 276). The process did not continue until the next administration came into office, but the efforts made by president Betancur did set a precedent for the following governments.

The approach of this liberal administration was focused on four premises recommended by the newly appointed negotiators: The executive would be in charge of the negotiations; the process should be conducted on the basis of the legitimacy of the state and the illegal character of the insurgents; only as a sign of good faith did the state offer amnesties, and was not, by any means, compelled to recognize the legitimacy of the guerrillas; and last, the government’s institutions were the only valid means for reform, which was not negotiable outside the establishment (Chernick 1999, 178).

However, Barco did continue the PNR, and used it with the same purpose of the previous government: as an attempt to diminish support of the guerrillas in marginal areas through tangible government intervention. At the same time, the official truce with the FARC was maintained, although both parties had repeatedly broken it off unofficially. The ELN, on the other hand, began changing its strategy by targeting the country’s economic infrastructure, such as oil pipelines and power supply stations, which began to be bombed and systematically destroyed (García Durán 1992, 50-51), a practice that became characteristic of that group and remains even today.

The ELN led the CNG through its actions, and took advantage of an apparent weakening of the M-19 caused by internal division. Meanwhile, the conflict escalated between government forces and FARC fronts at the same time as the assassination of UP leaders increased in urban centers, allegedly by self-defense groups and some right-wing factions of the military. By early 1987, the UP had broken off relations with the FARC and proclaimed its independence from the group. At this point the FARC and the CNG created a greater coalition, called the Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolivar, (CGSB) The Simon Bolivar Guerrillera Coordinator, which grouped the five largest guerrilla forces of the country (Kline 1999, 32-38).

The government was forced to shift towards a negotiated policy to settle the conflict when an M-19 squad kidnapped conservative leader Alvaro Gomez on May 1988. As the year ended, Barco presented the "Peace Initiative", a document clearly establishing a timeline for demobilization, and proposing the concentration of insurgent forces in demilitarized areas, a step meant to avoid undesired clashes between the rebels and government forces (a lesson learned from the previous administration). The CGSB rejected the government’s proposal, but the M-19 distanced itself from the coalition and accepted Barco’s initiative, a pronouncement that eventually led to the group’s demobilization (Zuluaga Nieto 1999, 22).

The M-19’s decision to initiate a dialogue was influenced by their military flaw, and the devastating effects of the Toma del Palacio, which undermined their public support and took a heavy toll on their general acceptance. This guerrilla’s decline was also set in motion by the increase of armed self-defense groups opposing the methods and ideals of the militant left, with actions that shifted the balance of power amid the conflict’s major actors. Between 1989 and 1990, the group held dialogues with the government in the departamento of Cauca, and agreed to demobilize over a period of six months. Despite congressional opposition to the president’s reform, both actors vowed to respect what had been agreed upon, and the definitive truce and demobilization took place shortly before the 1990 presidential elections (Kline 1999, 42-43).

The CGSB stayed out of the negotiations, but the EPL approached the government to follow the steps of the M-19, in an agreement that had to wait until the next administration. Meanwhile, the eyes of all other guerrilla groups were on the transition of the M-19 into a political force, and the assassination of their leader and presidential candidate, Carlos Pizarro, set a precedent and warned the rebels of the reluctance of some sectors of society to accept the guerrilla fight as a legitimate road to political participation. Nevertheless, the AD-M-19, as the group’s political party was called, obtained over half a million votes on the presidential round and became the largest force outside the traditional parties (Zuluaga 1999, 39), gaining a political momentum that would continue for some time, and giving them a significant role in the Constitutional Assembly of the following administration.

President Gaviria supported the idea of a Constitutional reform, which was for the first time implemented through popular suffrage. One of the leading projects during his term was a policy of economic openness, as well as his interest on "internal" security, which led his administration to nominate a civilian as Defense Minister, an unprecedented act that increased the relevance of civilian population on the government-military decision-making process (Granada 1999). As these changes were taking place, the newly created AD-M19 became the second largest political force elected to the National Constitutional Assembly, gaining nineteen of the seventy seats of the Constituyente.

Gaviria’s peace strategy followed the previous administration’s policy of limited demilitarization to facilitate negotiations, and unilateral cease-fire of government forces. Combined with the possibility to participate in the Constitutional Assembly (Chernick 1999, 180), the offer resulted fairly attractive to some guerrillas. The state also elaborated a "National Strategy against Violence," a plan developed to address some root-causes of the increasing violence, such as the inability of government forces to maintain the "monopoly of force" (Rangel 2001, 364).

Nevertheless, this government became relatively more flexible on its demands, abolishing the cease-fire as a precondition for negotiations, and presenting its willingness to negotiate how demobilized groups would control territories during the reinsertion process. This approach proved effective with three small and medium sized guerrillas: the MAQL, whose main concern was the well being of indigenous communities in the Cauca region, and the ELN and PRT, forces that negotiated a reinsertion seeking political acceptance, and whose interests were focused on regional development in their areas of influence (García Durán 1992, 53-55).

The 1991 Constitution has been criticized by some for its ineffectiveness in achieving a lasting peace, mainly because "the objectives of the guerrillas remained unfeasible within the newly created institutions, (Author’s translation)" while at the same time, government and guerrillas still believed they could impose their conditions on each other (Gómez Albarello 2000, 273). The strongest groups, FARC and ELN, remained outside the dialogues during the Constituyente, and clashes between them and government forces increased that year. However, once the new Constitution was drafted, Gaviria attempted to revive the negotiations for the last time. The government and the CGSB delegations met in Caracas, Venezuela, and Tlaxcala, Mexico to discuss a set agenda, but the assassination of a former minister during the negotiations marked the end of this administration’s peace initiative. At this point, the insurgents had lost the government’s recognition, and consequently the political legitimacy that such acknowledgement implied (Chernick 1999, 181-182).

Gaviria’s government was able to dismantle three influential guerrilla forces and reincorporate them into civilian life. However, the strategy proved unfruitful with the largest and better prepared forces of the FARC and ELN, who believed their cause was still attainable through violent means. The peace process stalled until the next presidential term, but the levels of violence continued to increase for the remaining time of this administration.

Once more, the new government was willing to negotiate a peaceful resolution to the escalating conflict, but this time the situation was different for the state. Contrary to what happened in the previous mandate, where president Gaviria received the support of large sectors of society, Mr. Samper was accused of having financed his campaign with funds from the drug cartels. He faced a legitimacy crisis, and opposition forces formed a coalition against his government that left him struggling to remain in office (Molano 2000a, 30)

To make matters worst, there was an escalation in the actions of the FARC guerrilla, and their "display of military power and territorial control" (Author’s translation) increased significantly during Samper’s mandate (Vargas Meza 1999, 45). In spite of the circumstances, the president directed his advisors to evaluate the political relevance of the guerrillas, and concluded that it was necessary to find a negotiated solution to the conflict, a decision that immediately returned to the insurgents the political status they had lost with their actions in the previous government (Chernick 1999, 182).

The FARC demanded the demilitarization of La Uribe, in the Meta department, and conditioned their participation in a negotiation as long as the right wing self-defense groups were dismantled and combated by the government. Just as Samper was ready to agree to those terms (among others), opposition forces were determined to undermine the president’s initiative. Led by prominent figures, including former Army officers, church representatives, the American ambassador, and important economic groups, Samper opponents forced him to withdraw from the initiative (Molano 2000a 30).

The influence of such forces, including the pressure coming from Washington, made it increasingly difficult for Samper to manage the country’s internal affairs, as all his attention was concentrated in staying in office. A judicial process was initiated against the people involved in the campaign scandal, and a movement to impeach the president nearly succeeded in its objective.

The rebels realized that there were not enough warranties for them to continue the dialogues, and declared that they had no interest in negotiating with this administration. In a demonstration of how much the balance of power had changed since the process started, it was the FARC (whose leaders struggled twenty years earlier to obtain political recognition) which now rejected the government as a "valid interlocutor" to negotiate a peace agreement (Chernick 1999, 184).

Generally speaking, the Samper years were dead in terms of advances for the peace process. The president’s main concern, which initially had been the resolution of the conflict with the remaining rebel groups, was entirely overshadowed by the "narco-tapes" scandal, and his energy and attention shifted towards the accusations against him. Meanwhile, the rebels continued their military buildup and the conflict intensified until the end of Samper’s mandate.

Even before Mr. Pastrana assumed the presidency, it had already become evident that his government’s top priority would be a negotiated solution to the armed conflict. As elected president, he visited Tirofijo’s base camp and briefly discussed the terms under which the FARC would negotiate once his administration took office. The visit was described by Alfredo Rangel, a prominent political scientist and Colombianist, who later served as advisor to the current Defense Minister, as "the most important political accomplishment of the FARC in its nearly forty years of insurgent fight" (Author’s Translation.). He also added that this guerrilla was at its historical paramount, both politically and militarily (Rangel 2001, 182), an assertion difficult to ignore, given the fact that the group has an estimated 15.000 to 17.000 combatants, and controls an area the size of Switzerland, which was demilitarized of government troops as a precondition to initiate the dialogues.

The situation was different with the ELN. Some authors point out that the government showed an "evident lack of interest towards the negotiation" (Author’s translation.) with this group, and present various theories in an attempt to explain why this may have been the case. Among them, the idea that the government’s interest was to strengthen ties with the FARC before moving forward with other rebels, or even an effort to turn the groups against each other (Molano 2000b, 103).

In any event, the government underestimated the relevance of the ELN and the importance they placed on participating in the dialogues. The group demanded (as their own initiative to become part of the peace process), the demilitarization of four municipalities in the Bolivar department. As a response to the government’s negative, the ELN performed two "massive kidnappings," an action that cost them the loss of their political recognition (Zuluaga Nieto 2000, 42). Eventually the tension dissipated, and after several encounters between representatives of both sides, a renovated dialogue is due to start in early 2002.

Pastrana’s proposal for both insurgent forces includes the demobilization and reintegration to civil society, and even leaves an open option to accept the paramilitaries on the negotiating table, (which at this time seems unrealistic given the intractable position of the guerrillas over this point). It contemplates programs to reduce violence, addresses the issue of internally displaced civilians, and considers changes to the judicial and educational systems, to mention some of the most relevant issues (Moser 2000, 53-59). It also accepts the necessity of a demilitarized area to facilitate the dialogues.

The peace process with the FARC during the Pastrana government has had major advances and setbacks since it began on November 1998. Thus far, the government has extended the time limit for the despeje (the demilitarized zone) on five occasions, and the dialogues have been "frozen" by either side a number of times. The strategy followed by the FARC has been traditionally to advance as much as possible during each negotiation and wait for the ideal time to produce their demands. In the short-run, they have created a five-year plan to increase their forces to 30.000 men and divide them into one hundred combat fronts (Rangel 2000, 182 – 183). Today this plan has developed in the middle of violent battles between government forces and guerrilla rebels, which have continued despite repeated attempts by the state to negotiate a cease-fire during the dialogues.

Pastrana received public support during the first months of his mandate, but as the dialogues extended and no results were evident, the president had to deal with harsh criticism, both within his government and outside of it. His worst crisis took place on May, 1999, when his Defense minister and several generals and high-ranking officers presented their resignation in discomfort for the way the despeje was being handled. The president was forced to become less flexible with the rebels, and to take into account the military’s relevance in the process by stressing the need to strengthen the Armed Forces (Zuluaga Nieto 2000, 40).

The United States has played a significant role during this process, and a controversial $1.3 billion aid package has been destined to "Plan Colombia," an initiative of the Colombian government to get foreign countries involved in the nation’s fight against narcotraffic. Many human rights advocates have opposed the proposal, citing human rights violations by government forces, and warning about the danger of possible U.S. military involvement in the conflict (Delacour 2000, 63).

The international community as a whole has shown interest on the development of the process; the United Nations set up an office in Bogotá, and the European Union has also expressed its concern and shown its support to president Pastrana’s initiative. Neighboring countries have followed the developments closer, and have expressed diverse opinions as well, mostly supportive of the government’s actions (Ramirez 2001, 27 – 32).

Throughout the five governments it is possible to observe a broad, general strategy transformed to some extent by each administration according to the demands of the moment: First, the establishment of a demilitarized zone where dialogues are to be held, followed by a negotiation agenda to discuss the demands and concerns of each group. The prevailing government interest is demobilization and reincorporation, and the guerrilla’s final goal is attaining political participation in order to implement their ideals through the institutions of the state. In studying the evolution of conflict resolution strategies in Colombia’s peace process, I have identified five variables and two desired outcomes:

1. Demilitarization:

With exception of the Samper government, all other administrations recognized the need and granted a neutral space in which negotiations could take place without interference of "outside" actors; namely, the armed forces. Although the experience was not always positive, and conditions such as size and location of the area played an important role (especially for the rebels, who wanted the territory to be located in their areas of historical influence), it yielded positive results in the Barco and Gaviria administrations, which demobilized the M-19, the EPL, PRT, and the MAQL.

However, the demilitarized area granted by the Pastrana government had an entirely different connotation, since it was not merely a zone for negotiations, but an extension of roughly the size of a small country (42.000 Square Kilometers). This concession allowed the FARC guerrillas to extend their dominion and consolidate their forces, strengthening their position in the negotiations, and granting them unprecedented political significance. Nevertheless, such gestures of peace on the government side did not yield the expected outcome, and on February 21, 2002, after a series of FARC military actions, the government called an end to the Zona de Despeje, and the Armed Forces proceeded to re-take the area after a three-hour notice.

2. Cease Fire:

It was only a pre-condition to initiate dialogues in first two administrations, but president Gaviria decided to open a rather controversial strategy of initiating peace negotiations while still combating the rebels in different areas of the country. During his term the approach proved to be successful with the already mentioned small and medium-sized guerrillas, whose interest inclined more towards a tangible opportunity of political participation rather than a long-term armed struggle, for which only the larger guerrillas were prepared. President Samper considered this variable, as well as the demilitarization, but they were not implemented because the rebels were never willing to engage in dialogues with his weak administration.

Although in some instances it was not fully respected, as it was the case during the Barco government when repeated skirmishes between the rebels and members of the armed forces took place, the cease-fire was a binding agreement that forced both actors to at least attempt to approach each other. This element of the negotiations is extremely sensitive, because in the event that either the rebels or government forces wished to put an end to the process, all it was needed was an accusation that the enemy had broken the truce.

For Andres Pastrana, the cease-fire became a priority only after his government realized that the FARC guerrillas were using their area of influence as a hideout, and had no apparent intentions of diminishing the intensity of the conflict. He did not, however, made this variable a precondition to the dialogues. As such, it became an unattainable concession on the side of the guerrillas, who were benefiting from their display of power and at the same time by the political relevance that the government had given them.

3. Amnesty:

Offered by all the governments that engaged in negotiations as an incentive to reach an agreement, it was implemented by Barco and Gaviria with the demobilized groups. This condition must be considered by the state as a gesture of "good fate," and has always been demanded by the rebels as a requisite for surrender or reinsertion. Once the parties seat at the negotiating table, an implicit political recognition is granted to the insurgent force, and therefore amnesty is almost a given variable.

4. Reinsertion:

More an outcome than a variable, took place during the successful completion of the demobilizations of the Barco and Gaviria governments; the members of the amnestied guerrillas returned to civilian life, and were given a sum of money in exchange for their weapons. This experience represents an important step in the negotiation process, especially to those forces that remain outside the law and closely follow the outcome and faith of their fellow combatants who decided to accept the "enemy’s" terms. If the reinsertion is a success, it will become a powerful bargaining tool for the government, as it was initially the case of the M-19.

5. Peace Initiative:

It is crucial to determine where did the peace initiative come from in order to evaluate a future outcome of the negotiations. Over the past two decades the pattern has been that whenever the initiative originates from the rebel’s side, an agreement has been reached. This proposal comes also with a positive response from the government, and the support of the military. On the other hand, if the peace proposal originates from the government, the outcome has not been favorable so far. This is not to say that the pattern is infallible, however, both the FARC and the ELN (the two major active groups) have followed the same ideology and tough negotiating position with all five administrations.

Three presidents attempted under their own initiative to reach an agreement with the rebels; Betancur and Pastrana struggled to find a peaceful resolution to the conflict, and so would have done Samper, or at least that was his explicit intention if the guerrillas had accepted his terms. But this situation has only represented an advantage to the rebels, who have become strengthened and have obtained political recognition every time a government has offered to negotiate with them.

6. Political Transition:

I have defined this variable as the completion of a transition from an insurgency force into a political party subsequent to demobilization. The three major examples are the Patriotic Union (UP), the AD-M19, and the "Peace, Hope and Liberty," a political movement that sprung from the EPL. They took place in the governments of Betancur, Barco and Gaviria respectively. The experience with these parties has not been very promising; as I discussed earlier, UP militants and leaders were assassinated in massive numbers, and the AD-M19 acceptance in the 1990s’ gradually vanished as the decade ended.

A second element of this transition was the Constitutional Assembly of 1991, which allowed demobilized groups to take part in the writing of a new Constitution, a golden opportunity for those who claimed the country needed major structural changes. In it, only the smaller demobilized groups participated, and the visible presence of the AD-M19 was a particular feature. But again, FARC and ELN rebels distanced themselves from the occasion.

7. Demobilization:

The concrete results of the peace process became evident on these last two features, the political transition and the demobilization. The governments of Barco and Gaviria were able to consolidate the work that began during the Betancur administration, and the breaking point of the Constitutional Assembly marked a new era in the negotiations. Those who were left outside would remain trying to find political participation through violent means.

The four years of the Samper administration were almost an "interruption" to the ongoing process, which re-initiated with impetus during the Pastrana era and was again drastically disrupted by the sudden end of the demilitarized area. Today, there are nearly 20.000 guerrilla forces combined, plus at least another 10.000 to 15.000 members of the counter-insurgency forces, which would eventually need to be demobilized and reincorporated into society, a major challenge for the new administration, whose term will begin on August 7, 2002.

Eric Selbin has defined a revolution as an "effort to transform society" (1999, 66), but such effort may turn into an escalation of the conflict in Colombia. The insurgent forces of the FARC have become stronger and better prepared over the last few years, and their strength does not translate into weaker arguments. On the contrary, they have hardened their position and increased their demands, and the government is dangerously approaching the limits of its bargaining position. In the words of professor Javier Guerrero Barón, "the tactical strength of the guerrillas diminishes the likelihood of negotiation" (2001, 20), because they are less willing to negotiate what they consider relevant, at the same time as the government depends on the support of all sectors of society, who have been pushed to the verge by the kidnappings, extortions, and demands of guerrilla groups.

Today’s insurgency differs from the 1950s’ in the sense that what once was a revolution has now become a way of life. With an economy of war that represents over 12% of the country’s GDP, the conflict became a profitable venture for a small portion of society (Richiani 1997, 62), and a rather expensive proposition for the country as a whole. Many authors agree on what professors Frank Safford and Marco Palacios clearly present in their thorough study of Colombian history:

Ideologically, the guerrillas have lost their battle. Nevertheless, authors Harvey Kline and Vanessa Gray indicate three possible outcomes to the actual situation: Either a continuation of the country’s "kind of liberal democracy" and an increase in violence; the less viable option of a military coup; and the even more remote possibility of a "collapse of the traditional order" (2000, 225). In spite of the efforts made by the Pastrana government, the last stage of the process has advanced little to accomplish peace. The dialogues have developed in the midst of an increasing violence, and the FARC guerrilla continues its military buildup at the same time as it steps up its actions against the civilian population. Accordingly, the government has also increased the power of its military, benefited by the influx of dollars from Plan Colombia, and by implementing a national strategy to expand the armed forces’ control over the territory.

The international community has shown its interest in a peaceful resolution to the conflict, as it has become evident by the numerous visits of representatives from European and American organizations. Their participation has been crucial to increase the relevance of the dialogues, and to pressure all parties in the achievement of a consensus. The guerrillas are no longer acting at an empty stage, and the presence of international delegates has forced them to measure the consequences of their actions with greater care.

With only few months left in office, and the crucial determination of having put an end to the demilitarized area, president Pastrana has directed the full weight of the international community to the FARC. To date, most governments have supported Mr. Pastrana’s decision and have blamed the outcome on the insurgents’ actions. It is imperative to note that the FARC, the ELN and the AUC are part of the United State’s terrorist organization’s list, and given the actual state of affairs following the terrorist events of September 2001, many governments have drastically shifted their policies towards such organizations.

The European Union has cancelled the Visas of FARC representatives, the Japanese government has threatened to pressure the Colombian government for military results if a Japanese citizen is not released from FARC’s captivity, and the United States has pledged full support to the decisions of the Colombian president. Meanwhile, the FARC has already announced its intentions to negotiate with the upcoming government, however, the most recent polls indicate that Colombians are favoring a hard-line candidate, who will only bargain under the precondition of a cease-fire.

On the other hand, talks with the ELN are still in progress, although the latest events have shifted the public as well as the government’s full attention to the FARC’s situation. Nevertheless, Mr. Pastrana may redirect his initiative towards the smaller and relatively weaker ELN in an attempt to save his peace proposal. In either case, the following presidential election will measure the effects of the lengthy Pastrana-FARC peace process, and whoever sits in office will have to face a hardened guerrilla force, whose credibility has been weakened, and whose leadership will be eager to regain the political status they have recently lost.